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FURTHER HARM AND HARASSMENT: THE COST
OF EXCESS PROCESS TO VICTIMS OF SEXUAL
VIOLENCE ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES
Hannah Walsh*
There are men and women, boys and girls, who are survivors, and there are men and
women, boys and girls who are wrongfully accused . . . [T]he rights of one person can
never be paramount to the rights of another . . . . Due process is the foundation of any
system of justice that seeks a fair outcome. Due process either protects everyone, or it
protects no one.
—Betsy DeVos, U.S. Secretary of Education1

INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2011, the campus sexual assault crisis in the United
States began receiving unprecedented media attention.2 At the same time,
the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) within the Department of Education
(DOE) promulgated new Title IX enforcement policies via the “Dear Colleague” letter in an effort to curb gender-based violence on campuses nationwide.3 The letter required4 universities receiving federal funding to lower
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2021. Bachelor of Business
Administration in Business Honors, Texas A&M University, 2018. I would like to thank
Professors Jennifer Mason McAward and Patricia O’Hara for their feedback and
encouragement, and my colleagues on the Notre Dame Law Review for their diligent editing
and support. All errors are my own.
1 Betsy DeVos, U.S. Sec’y of Educ., Address at George Mason Univ. (Sept. 7, 2017)
[hereinafter DeVos Address]. For a transcript of the address, see Read Betsy DeVos’ Speech
About Changing Obama-Era Policies on Campus Sexual Assault, TIME (Sept. 7, 2017), https://
time.com/4932283/betsy-devos-title-ix-sexual-assault-speech-transcript/.
2 See Eilene Zimmerman, Campus Sexual Assault: A Timeline of Major Events, N.Y. TIMES
(June 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/23/education/campus-sexualassault-a-timeline-of-major-events.html.
3 “Dear Colleague” Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 2 (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/
colleague-201104.pdf [hereinafter 2011 Dear Colleague Letter]. The scope of this Note
will not include an evaluation of the Title IX policies or policymaking processes of the
Obama-era Department of Education.
4 The guidelines in the 2011 Dear Colleague letter were not issued pursuant to formal notice-and-comment rulemaking and thus technically did not add requirements to
applicable law. However, the letter was issued as a “significant guidance document” under
the Office of Management and Budget’s Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Prac1785
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the standard of proof in sexual assault proceedings to a preponderance of
the evidence and recommended that they implement appeals processes and
shorten timeframes for adjudications to sixty days.5 The new guidelines also
“strongly discourage[d] schools from allowing the parties personally to question or cross-examine each other during the hearing.”6 As a result of the
increased attention to the issue, the complaints received by the Education
Department annually about how campuses handle sexual violence more than
tripled during the Obama administration.7 Under threat of losing federal
funding and facing escalating public relations crises, universities nationwide
rapidly undertook steps to comply.8
Gradually, the entire zeitgeist surrounding gender-based violence, sexual harassment, and male-female power imbalances began to shift, culminating in the rapid spread of the #MeToo movement in 2017. During that same
time period, the resistance to this burgeoning feminist effort, once reserved
only for those on the fringes of society, progressively became more mainstream.9 President Trump, addressing the nation, referred to this period as
“a very scary time for young men in America.”10
tices. Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3439 (Jan. 25,
2007). OCR stated in the letter that the guidelines were intended to “provide[ ] information and examples to inform recipients [of federal funding] about how OCR evaluates
whether covered entities are complying with their legal obligations.” 2011 Dear Colleague
letter, supra note 3, at 1 n.1. Thus, universities perceived themselves to be at risk of losing
federal funds if they failed to comport with the letter’s guidelines.
5 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 10–12.
6 Id. at 12.
7 Libby Nelson, Sexual Assault on Campus, VOX (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.vox
.com/2014/10/15/18088608/campus-sexual-assault-title-ix.
8 See, e.g., Samantha Harris & KC Johnson, Campus Courts in Court: The Rise in Judicial
Involvements in Campus Sexual Misconduct Adjudications, 22 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 49,
58 (2019) (noting that in April 2011, thirty-nine of the nation’s top 100 colleges did not
use a preponderances standard in sexual misconduct adjudications but by 2016, all of them
did).
9 For a discussion of extremist viewpoints gaining traction due to high-profile false
accusations of sexual violence against women, see Reeves Wiedeman, The Duke Lacrosse
Scandal and the Birth of the Alt-Right, N.Y. MAG (Apr. 14, 2017), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/04/the-duke-lacrosse-scandal-and-the-birth-of-the-alt-right.html.
10 Nanette Asimov, #MeToo Movement Spurs #HimToo Backlash: ‘People Don’t Want to
Believe,’ S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 13, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/nation/article/MeToomovement-spurs-HimToo-backlash-People-13304270.php (describing the “male-as-victim
movement,” largely promoted by the families of male students accused of sexual assault in
university proceedings). For an argument that popular concerns regarding the perceived
unjust treatment of the “villains” of the #MeToo movement have been overblown, see Richard Beck, #MeToo Is Not a Witch Hunt, VOX (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/12/21/16803206/metoo-not-sex-moral-panic (noting that of the highest-profile
accusations of sexual harassment resulting from the movement, the accusations had been
largely corroborated or gone unrebutted, while the “punishment” faced by those accused
was appropriate: public shaming by the media and termination of employment).
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All this resistance coupled with the watershed policy changes, increased
oversight from the OCR, and rushed university overcompliance11 led to a rise
in concern for the rights of those accused of sexual harassment and assault
on college campuses. Critics, including academics,12 men’s rights activists,13
civil rights groups,14 and the popular media,15 became more vocal about the
pattern of overcorrection they saw among universities in the aftermath of the
2011 Dear Colleague letter, citing concerns about fairness to respondents
and the legitimacy of the disciplinary processes as a whole. During this time
period, universities saw an increase in suits from students accused of sexual
harassment alleging they were deprived of their Fourteenth Amendment

11

See STOP ABUSE & VIOLENT ENV’TS, LAWSUITS AGAINST UNIVERSITIES FOR ALLEGED MISSEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES 1 (2016), http://www.saveservices.org/wp-content/uploads/Sexual-Misconduct-Lawsuits-Report2.pdf [hereinafter 2016 SAVE REPORT]
(“[M]any colleges implemented changes that went well beyond the requirements of the
Dear Colleague Letter, such as relying on a single investigator to adjudicate the case and
imposing interim sanctions before the investigation was completed.”).
12 See, e.g., Open Letter from Members of the Penn Law Sch. Faculty on Sexual Assault
Complaints: Protecting Complainants and the Accused Students at Universities (Feb. 18,
2015) , http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/2015_0218_upenn.pdf; Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Opinion, Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, BOS. GLOBE
(Oct. 14, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvardsexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html (publicizing an
open letter signed by twenty-eight Harvard Law School professors criticizing the university’s new Title IX policy as going significantly beyond the OCR requirements).
13 See, e.g., Gordon Finley, Rescind “Dear Colleague” Letter, WASH. TIMES (May 29, 2017),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/29/letter-to-the-editor-rescind-dearcolleague-letter/ (urging President Trump to rescind the Obama-era guidelines on the
grounds that the “fabricated” campus rape crisis was part of a progressive effort to continue a “war on men”). Gordon Finley is a National Coalition for Men (NCFM) adviser.
NCFM reprinted Finley’s Washington Times opinion on its website. NCFM Advisor Gordan
Finley Ph.D, Rescind “Dear Colleague” Letter, NAT’L COALITION FOR MEN (May 30, 2017),
https://ncfm.org/2017/05/news/discrimination-news/discrimination-against-men-news/
ncfm-adviser-gordon-finley-ph-d-rescind-dear-colleague-letter/. For another example of
men’s rights activists’ involvement, see also SAVE OUR SONS, https://helpsaveoursons.com
(last visited Feb. 16, 2020) (tracking antimale state legislation, publicizing male plaintiff
victories in due process litigation against universities, uncovering the “campus rape frenzy,”
and connecting male students who have been falsely accused of campus sexual misconduct
with legal assistance).
14 See, e.g., Campus Due Process Litigation Tracker, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC.,
https://www.thefire.org/research/campus-due-process-litigation-tracker/ (last visited Feb.
7, 2020) (tracking due process litigation arising from disciplinary processes on college
campuses).
15 See, e.g., Emily Yoffe, The Uncomfortable Truth About Campus Rape Policy, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/09/the-uncomfortable-truth-about-campus-rape-policy/538974/ (demonstrating the negative impact of
overly restrictive Title IX policies on respondents); see also Kathryn Joyce, The Takedown of
Title IX, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/05/magazine/the-takedown-of-title-ix.html.
HANDLING OF
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right to procedural due process during Title IX disciplinary hearings.16 Ultimately, this litigation would culminate in First17 and Sixth18 Circuit holdings
suggesting that a respondent in a Title IX hearing at a public university is
entitled to some form of examination of their complainant.
Meanwhile, on September 7, 2017, Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos,
on behalf of the Trump administration, announced the DOE would be
rescinding the 2011 Dear Colleague letter guidance and instead initiating a
formal notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure to “replace the current
approach with a workable, effective, and fair system.”19 These changes,
including a live hearing requirement, a directive to presume a respondent’s
innocence, and a mandate to provide an opportunity for live cross-examination via an agent of the parties, would constitute a significant departure from
the priorities of the Obama-era DOE and indicate a shift toward adopting
procedural safeguards typically reserved for criminal trial in the setting of
educational disciplinary hearings.
This Note20 argues that in employing the Mathews v. Eldridge21 test to
formulate the constitutional minimum process necessary to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment in a Title IX university disciplinary hearing, federal
courts have failed to adequately weigh the inevitable harm to survivors that
will result from allowing one accused of sexual assault to personally crossexamine their accuser as part of the government interest at stake. Furthermore, this Note contends that any institution permitting the practice of
respondents cross-examining their complainants commits sex discrimination
in violation of Title IX by directly inflicting harm on its female students. Part
I will provide an overview of how federal courts’ interpretation of Title IX
evolved to protect students against sexual violence and harassment from
their classmates and how courts have applied the Fourteenth Amendment to
disciplinary hearings at public institutions of higher education. Part I will
then largely focus on two recent appellate court decisions diverging on the
16

See 2016 SAVE REPORT, supra note 11, at 2 (citing Title IX Legal Database, TITLE IX
ALL, https://www.titleixforall.com/#section-legal-risk-management (last visited Feb.
16, 2020)).
17 Haidak v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 933 F.3d 56, 69–71 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding that
respondent’s due process rights were not violated by the university’s denying him the
opportunity to cross-examine the complainant because the “inquisitorial” nature of the
questioning conducted by the university satisfied due process).
18 Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that “if a public university
has to choose between competing narratives to resolve a case, the university must give the
accused student or his agent an opportunity to cross-examine the accuser”).
19 DeVos Address, supra note 1.
20 For clarity and convenience, female pronouns (she, her, hers) will be ascribed to
accusers (complainants), while male pronouns (he, him, his) will be ascribed to those
accused (respondents) throughout this Note. This author recognizes that people of all
genders may be perpetrators or victims of sexual harassment and assault but notes that the
vast majority of cases of assault on campuses are committed against women. See Campus
Sexual Violence: Statistics, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/campus-sexual-violence
(last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
21 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

FOR
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degree of a respondent’s entitlement to cross-examination in these hearings.
Part II will then examine the psychological effects of the retraumatization
victims face when forced to confront their attackers in proceedings, the gender bias that may result, and how these considerations effect the Mathews
analysis. Finally, Part III will assess the proposed rule offered by the Department of Education for its fairness and ability to prevent systemic genderbased bias and will offer an alternative solution for protecting the due process rights of the accused.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

The Breadth of Title IX and Its Expansion to Include Student-on-Student
Sexual Assault and Harassment

Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 dictates that “[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”22 The statute was originally passed to expand the protections of the
Civil Rights Act of 196423 into the sphere of education in the face of rampant
gender discrimination. “[A]lthough gender-neutral sounding in today’s parlance,” the term “on the basis of sex” was originally intended to provide equal
access to education for female students and educators.24
It was not until 1979 that the Supreme Court found the statute contained an implied private cause of action, allowing individuals who had been
discriminated against by educational institutions based on their gender to
sue for injunctive relief.25 With the passage of the Civil Rights Remedies
Equalization Amendment of 1986, Congress formally abrogated the immunity of states under the Eleventh Amendment for damages actions under
Title IX.26 After the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 198727 was passed, virtually all institutions of higher education (both private and public) must be
compliant with Title IX.28 The prohibition on gender discrimination applies
22 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
23 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (making it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because of the employee’s “sex”).
24 Penny Venetis, Misrepresenting Well-Settled Jurisprudence: Peddling “Due Process” Clause
Fallacies to Justify Gutting Title IX Protections for Girls and Women, 40 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP.
126, 132 (2018).
25 Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979) (noting that in passing Title IX,
Congress sought to accomplish two objectives: (1) “to avoid the use of federal resources to
support discriminatory practices” and (2) “to provide individual citizens effective protection against those practices”).
26 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7.
27 Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1687–1688, 29 U.S.C. §§ 706, 794, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-4a,
6107).
28 The vast majority of “private” colleges and universities receive substantial funding
from the federal government in federal student loans, Pell grants, research grants and
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to schools’ admissions processes, access to financial aid, student services and
counseling, and athletics, and disallows any form of retaliation against a student or employee for reporting violations.29
Though today the statute is largely recognized as a tool to combat the
epidemic of gender-based violence on campuses, the text of Title IX makes
no mention of sexual assault or harassment, and for more than twenty years
after its enactment, no such suits were brought under the statute.30 However, in 1986, the Supreme Court ruled that sexual harassment did amount
to workplace discrimination on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII.31 In
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the Court held that sexual harassment,
even in the absence of tangible economic loss to a plaintiff, could impact the
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment and therefore amount to an
“arbitrary barrier to sexual equality” in violation of Title VII.32
Finally, in 1992, the Court endorsed this view of sex discrimination in
the context of education in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools.33
There, a student at a public high school who had been subject to continual
sexual harassment and coercive sexual acts from her coach sued her school
for money damages under Title IX.34 Writing for the Court, Justice White
explicitly invoked Meritor Savings Bank, drawing an analogy between a supervisor in a workplace and a teacher in a school.35 Though OCR guidelines
had previously categorized it as such, this was the first time the Court explicitly determined that sexual harassment could amount to discrimination in an
educational setting under Title IX.
tuition tax credits. Only a handful of private colleges reject all federal funding. See Nick
Anderson & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Hillsdale College, Subject of Senate Debate, Is Known for
Rejecting Federal Funds, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/education/hillsdale-college-subject-of-senate-debate-is-known-for-rejecting-federalfunds/2017/12/04/126f94ca-d91b-11e7-b1a8-62589434a581_story.html.
29 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATION: FORTY YEARS OF TITLE IX 1–2
(2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/06/20/titleixreport
.pdf.
30 Diane Heckman, Tracing the History of Peer Sexual Harassment in Title IX Cases, 183
EDUC. L. REP. 1, 2 (2004).
31 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67 (1986). During that time
period, the Supreme Court further expanded its interpretation of workplace discrimination based on sex under Title VII. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251
(1989) (plurality opinion) (recognizing “sex stereotyping” as a form of gender discrimination). For an analysis of how Title IX legislative history and judicial interpretation borrowed from, in many ways, that of other civil rights legislation, see JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE
MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION 231–32 (2002).
32 Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
33 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
34 Id. at 63–64.
35 Id. at 75 (“‘[W]hen a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the
subordinate’s sex, that supervisor “discriminate[s]” on the basis of sex’. We believe the
same rule should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.” (quoting
Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64) (citation omitted)).
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However, doubt as to whether a school could be held liable for studenton-student sexual harassment remained until Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education reached the Supreme Court in 1999.36 In her complaint, Aurelia
Davis alleged that the defendants, her daughter’s middle school principal,
superintendent, and school board, created “an intimidating, hostile, offensive and abus[ive] school environment” by acting with deliberate indifference toward the “persistent sexual advances and harassment” of a classmate,
undermining her daughter’s Title IX rights.37 Davis further argued that
“Title IX’s ‘unmistakable focus on the benefited class,’ rather than the perpetrator . . . compel[led] the conclusion that the statute works to protect students from the discriminatory misconduct of their peers.”38
Though an institution cannot be held liable under either an agency or a
negligence theory in Title IX actions, the Court ruled that there was evidence
that it was the defendants’ own actions that ultimately caused Davis’ daughter
to be subject to discriminatory harassment.39 The linchpin in favor of finding that a cause of action existed was the degree of authority the defendants
could exercise over both the context of the harassment and the harasser himself.40 Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor stated that in order to be
actionable, student-on-student harassment must be “so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive” as to “undermine[ ] and detract[ ] from the victims’
educational experience, [so] that the victim-students are effectively denied
equal access to an institution’s resources and opportunities.”41
Though the events in Davis occurred at a public middle school, where
administrators obviously retain significant control over the conduct of their
minor students throughout a structured school day, the extension of Title IX
protection to student victims of classmate sexual harassment applies in the
university setting as well.42 As directives to adequately respond to reports of
sexual assault and harassment and duties to take preventative measures were
incorporated into the DOE’s requirements regarding Title IX, universities
began implementing robust procedures to hear and adjudicate related
claims. As these processes became more formalized under OCR guidance
36 Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 635–36 (1999).
37 Id. (alternation in original).
38 Id. at 639 (citation omitted) (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 691
(1979)).
39 Id. at 640, 642, 652–54 (finding that the defendants’ actions caused Davis’s daughter to be subject to discriminatory harassment where multiple classmates were blatantly
and continually harassed by the same perpetrator, those classmates told the principal, and
the board made no effort to either investigate the allegations or put an end to the
harassment).
40 Id. at 646.
41 Id. at 651 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
42 For an argument that institutions of higher education bear many of the hallmarks
of “closed systems,” including exercising control over the daily activities of their students,
thus subjecting their students to unique potential for harm, see Hannah Brenner, A Title
IX Conundrum: Are Campus Visitors Protected from Sexual Assault?, 104 IOWA L. REV. 93, 107
(2018).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-4\NDL413.txt

1792

unknown

Seq: 8

notre dame law review

3-MAY-20

15:34

[vol. 95:4

and the court of public opinion became more powerful, questions gradually
began to arise regarding the rights of those accused in Title IX disciplinary
hearings.
B.

Current Fourteenth Amendment Requirements

The Fourteenth Amendment demands that no state shall “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”43 Fundamentally, procedural due process requires notice and the opportunity to be
heard,44 but it is also inherently “flexible” and “calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”45 Because of the significant
interest a student has in pursuing higher education, particularly as it relates
to reputation and future economic opportunities, courts have found that students have procedural due process rights in proceedings affecting their ability to continue to attend classes and participate in university activities.46
Notably, the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to proceedings at private universities.47
Universities are given significant leeway in determining how best to handle the misconduct of their students.48 Furthermore, courts have repeatedly
warned against requiring public universities to conform to the rules applying
in courts of law.49 However, where the most serious deprivations are at stake,
such as suspensions of significant length or permanent expulsion, courts
43 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
44 See Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2005).
45 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
46 Courts of appeals are split as to whether students have property interests in pursuing public higher education. See Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 659 n.2 (7th Cir.
2019) (noting that though the First, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits recognize a generalized
property interest in higher education and both the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have assumed
as such without deciding, the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits instead examine state law to determine whether there exists a legally protected entitlement to continued education at the university). Nonetheless, every circuit recognizes
that a public university may violate a student’s due process through unfair disciplinary
hearings.
47 Instead, suits against private universities are usually state breach of contract cases in
which plaintiffs allege that their university failed to follow its own internal rules of procedure. See, e.g., Doe v. Trs. of Bos. Coll., 942 F.3d 527 (1st Cir. 2019). In that case, the
district court imported Haidak’s holding that an opportunity for “quasi-cross-examination”
was required by the Fourteenth Amendment into the elements of a state contract claim for
“basic fairness.” Id. at 533. The First Circuit rejected that argument, reminding the plaintiff that “[Boston College] is not a public university or a government actor and is not
subject to due process requirements.” Id. Furthermore, the court refused to conflate constitutional requirements with the state law “basic fairness” elements on the basis of federalism concerns. Id. at 535 (“Federal courts are not free to extend the reach of state law.”).
48 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975) (“It is not the role of the federal
courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a
basis in wisdom or compassion.”).
49 See, e.g., Flaim, 418 F.3d at 635 (“[D]isciplinary hearings against students and faculty
are not criminal trials, and therefore need not take on many of those formalities . . . .”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-4\NDL413.txt

2020]

unknown

Seq: 9

further harm and harassment

3-MAY-20

15:34

1793

have found the Fourteenth Amendment to require additional process.50 To
determine what specific predeprivation process is due, courts balance the
three factors laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.51

Courts have repeatedly recognized that, though students are not entitled
to public higher education in the same way they are to primary and secondary schooling, students have a paramount interest in completing their education, particularly in avoiding mistaken exclusion from learning
opportunities.52 Additionally, as social pressures have mounted, universities
have begun punishing rape more severely; the potential for social stigma and
reduced career opportunities for those accused has correspondingly
increased.53 Accused students have strong personal and economic interests
in avoiding these negative consequences (which can often have profound
and lasting impacts, regardless of whether the respondent was ultimately
found responsible for misconduct or not).54
On the other hand, universities have an important interest in protecting
themselves from financial liability, as failure to comply with OCR Title IX
requirements could result in a complete loss of federal funding for the institution.55 Universities also have a strong interest in balancing the need for
fair discipline against the need to allocate resources toward promoting the
primary function of the institutions: education.56 Finally, courts have found
that educational institutions have strong interests in creating safe learning
50 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (“Longer suspensions or expulsions
for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal
procedures.”).
51 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
52 See, e.g., Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 1988).
53 Tamara Rice Lave, READY, FIRE, AIM: How Universities Are Failing the Constitution in
Sexual Assault Cases, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 637, 701 (2016).
54 Stigma alone is not sufficient harm to result in a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
55 Note, however, that no school has ever lost federal funding for violating Title IX.
See R. Shep Melnick, The Strange Evolution of Title IX, 36 NAT’L AFFS. 19, 21 (2018) (“Exercising this ‘nuclear option’ is simply too administratively cumbersome and politically perilous.”). Furthermore, the DOE currently has no legal mechanism to levy fines against Title
IX violators, though a bill to allow the DOE to do so has been introduced in the House.
Hold Accountable and Lend Transparency (HALT) on Campus Sexual Violence Act, H.R.
3381, 116th Cong. § 4(5) (2019) (allowing the DOE “to impose a civil penalty to be paid by
an institution of higher education that has violated a law under the jurisdiction of the
Office for Civil Rights, the amount of which shall be determined by the gravity of the
violation, and the imposition of which shall not preclude other remedies available under
Federal law”).
56 See Gorman, 837 F.2d at 14–15.
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environments by protecting their students from harm inflicted by those
whose behavior violates the basic values of the school.57
In balancing the interests of those accused against those of educational
institutions, the federal courts have made clear distinctions between the procedural due process rights one would have in a court of law and those constitutionally required in a university proceeding. The Supreme Court held in
Goss v. Lopez that students are entitled to “effective notice” and an “informal
hearing” prior to the implementation of a serious sanction, just as plaintiffs
are entitled to in criminal courts and most administrative proceedings.58
Unlike in a criminal trial, in which the rules of evidence are designed to err
on the side of the defendant, DOE guidance has consistently provided that
any right granted to one party must be provided to the other.59 Furthermore, under the 2011 Dear Colleague letter, the standard of proof in Title
IX hearings was a preponderance of the evidence, a far cry from the criminal
trial standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.60 Notably, the Supreme Court
has never found that either a respondent or a complainant in a university
disciplinary proceeding is entitled to legal representation, and multiple
courts of appeals have affirmatively stated that students do not possess such a
right.61 In contrast, a defendant in a criminal trial possesses a constitutional
right to legal counsel.62
In criminal trials, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause mandates that a defendant has a right “to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.”63 Though there is often corroborating extrinsic evidence available, frequently the only witness who can testify to the actual events that
57 See Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 599 (6th Cir. 2018).
58 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975). Several circuits have adopted the Fifth
Circuit’s holding that sufficient notice necessitates providing the accused with information
about the charges alleged and a description of the evidence that would, if proven, justify
the sanction, and a proper hearing requires an opportunity to present a defense. See
Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158–59 (5th Cir. 1961); see also Marie T.
Reilly, Due Process in Public University Discipline Cases, 120 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1001, 1003
(2016).
59 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Q&A ON CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 4 (2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-title-ix-201709.pdf.
60 See 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 10–11.
61 See Gorman, 837 F.2d at 16.
62 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963).
63 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause was incorporated against the
states in Pointer v. Texas., 380 U.S. 400, 407–08 (1965). Note that this right to cross-examination in criminal trials is not unlimited. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990)
(holding that while live cross-examination is strongly preferred, in special circumstances
public policy may call for alternative means); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 132–33 (1968)
(quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692–94 (1931)) (holding that a trial judge
has both the discretion to determine when cross-examination has been exhausted as well as
the duty to protect witnesses from questions exceeding the proper bounds of cross-examination meant solely to harass, annoy, or humiliate them). For further explanation of how
these limitations, particularly accommodations for child victims and other susceptible witnesses, are justified largely by the Court’s desire to “ensure truthful and unencumbered
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occurred in a sexual assault case is the complainant herself, rendering victim
testimony essential to any finding of fact.64 Therefore, in a criminal trial, a
defendant has a constitutional right to cross-examine his accuser. In such a
situation, unless the defendant was pro se, questioning would occur indirectly via defendant’s counsel. However, respondents in university disciplinary hearings currently have no right to an attorney, and schools have the
discretion to determine whether or not to permit parties to have third-party
agents represent them in Title IX proceedings.65 Thus, if procedural due
process granted respondents in Title IX hearings the same right to crossexamination that defendants have in criminal trials, under current rules,
such a right would seem to include questioning of the complainant by the
respondent personally. However, until 2018, a circuit court had yet to issue
an opinion on the matter.
C.

The Circuit Split over a Respondent’s Right to Cross-Examination
in Title IX Disciplinary Hearings

In issuing its guidance for Title IX investigations and hearings, the
Obama-era DOE’s Dear Colleague letter provided: “OCR strongly discourages schools from allowing the parties personally to question or crossexamine each other during the hearing. Allowing an alleged perpetrator to
question an alleged victim directly may be traumatic or intimidating, thereby
possibly escalating or perpetuating a hostile environment.”66 Many universities nationwide immediately took steps to comply with OCR’s suggestion.67
1.

Sixth Circuit: Doe v. Baum

One such school was the University of Michigan. John Doe, a junior,
became the subject of a Title IX investigation when a female freshman
accused him of sexually assaulting her after she became extremely intoxicated at a party.68 Based on conflicting statements of the respondent, complainant, and their witnesses, the investigator concluded there was
insufficient evidence to support either party’s theory and recommended the
testimony,” see Alanna Clair, “An Opportunity for Effective Cross-Examination”: Limits on the
Confrontation Right of the Pro Se Defendant, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 719, 732 (2009).
64 The fact that the victim is likely the only person who can testify as to the events in
question is not unique to cases of sexual assault. For example, muggings and physical
assaults commonly occur in private or isolated spaces. For an argument that rhetoric suggesting otherwise originated in misogynistic English common law practices whose influence lingers today in the form of the concept of “he said, she said,” see Allison Leotta, I
Was a Sex-Crimes Prosecutor. Here’s Why ‘He Said, She Said’ Is a Myth, TIME (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://time.com/5413814/he-said-she-said-kavanaugh-ford-mitchell/.
65 Under the proposed rule, universities would be compelled to allow both parties to
be represented by an “agent” but would also be permitted to limit the involvement of that
agent in formal proceedings.
66 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 12.
67 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
68 Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 578–79 (6th Cir. 2018).
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case be closed.69 The complainant appealed, and after two closed sessions
that involved only a paper review of the investigator’s report, the three-person appeals board reversed, finding the complainant’s narrative “more credible” than Doe’s.70
Doe sued the university, alleging that his due process rights had been
violated during the disciplinary proceedings.71 Because the decision to sanction him ultimately turned on a determination of the credibility of the witnesses involved, he claimed he was entitled to live cross-examination of his
accuser and other adverse witnesses.72 The district court dismissed this
claim, reasoning that the university’s failure to provide an opportunity for
cross-examination was “immaterial.”73
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court in a split decision,
ultimately holding that where the outcome of a Title IX case hinged on a
question of competing narratives, “the university must give the accused student or his agent an opportunity to cross-examine the accuser and adverse
witnesses in the presence of a neutral fact-finder.”74 Deploying the Mathews
test, the majority emphasized what was at stake for Doe in the proceeding:
Being labeled a sex offender by a university has both an immediate and lasting impact on a student’s life. The student may be forced to withdraw from
his classes and move out of his university housing. His personal relationships might suffer. And he could face difficulty obtaining educational and
employment opportunities down the road, especially if he is expelled.75

In contrast, the opinion noted that the costs of implementing a process
including an opportunity for cross-examination would be low, particularly
because the university already provided such an option in all misconduct
cases other than those involving Title IX.76 Throughout the majority opinion, the court reiterated that live cross-examination was essential to attack a
witness’s credibility, particularly to identify inconsistencies in a witness’s
story, test his memory and intelligence, detect any existing ulterior motives,
and allow the fact-finder to observe the witness’s demeanor.77
According to the Sixth Circuit, live cross-examination, however, need
not entitle accused students to personally question their complainant. The
majority reasoned that a university’s “legitimate interest in avoiding procedures that may subject an alleged victim to further harm or harassment”
69 Id. at 580.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 581.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 578.
75 Id. at 582 (citations omitted) (citing Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 600 (6th Cir.
2018)).
76 Id.
77 Id.
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could easily be furthered by allowing a respondent’s agent to conduct any
cross-examination on his behalf.78
In his partial dissent, Judge Gilman questioned the repercussions of this
holding, believing that although the accused has a constitutional right to at
least a “circumscribed form” of cross-examination, allowing for the unfettered questioning by a representative was “a bridge too far.”79 Judge Gilman
also questioned the practicality of the majority’s allowance of an agent to
perform the questioning, wondering who that representative would be, how
the representative would be paid for, and what additional procedural protections would need to be in place.80
2.

First Circuit: Haidak v. University of Massachusetts-Amherst

In 2019, the question about a respondent’s entitlement to cross-examination arose in the First Circuit.81 There, James Haidak, the plaintiff, was
accused of assaulting and harassing his on-again-off-again girlfriend.82 The
University of Massachusetts-Amherst ultimately found Haidak responsible for
assault and failure to comply with no-contact orders after conducting a live
hearing.83 Haidak did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the complainant in the hearing but was permitted to submit questions to the hearing
board in advance.84 The board did not ask any of Haidak’s questions word
for word, but many of their inquiries were designed to elicit similar information.85 Haidak sued the university, arguing that by failing to accord him the
opportunity to question his complainant directly, the hearing board violated
his right to procedural due process.86 The district court rejected that claim,
relying on First Circuit precedent that declined to find cross-examination to
be an “essential requirement of due process” in the context of school disciplinary hearings.87
78 Id. at 583 (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857 (1990) (holding that where
forcing the accuser to testify in the physical presence of the defendant in a criminal case
may result in trauma, the court could ensure reliability through alternative procedures
which employed cross-examination and ensured that the accused could be observed by the
judge, jury, and defendant)).
79 Id. at 589 (citing Doe v. Cummins, 662 F. App’x 437, 446 (6th Cir. 2016)).
80 Id. (noting that a respondent has no constitutional right to an attorney, using a
university-sponsored representative would impose additional burdens on the university,
and that complications would arise should schools begin instituting rules of procedure and
evidence).
81 Haidak v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 933 F.3d 56, 68 (1st Cir. 2019).
82 Id. at 61–62.
83 Id. at 64.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 68.
87 Haidak v. Univ. of Mass. at Amherst, 299 F. Supp. 3d 242, 266 (D. Mass. 2018)
(quoting Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 1988)), aff’d in part, vacated in
part, and remanded, 933 F.3d 56.
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On appeal, the unanimous First Circuit affirmed, noting that, though
they can serve as a useful benchmark, “the rules that govern a common law
trial need not govern a university disciplinary proceeding.”88 Since an
accused student has no right to legal counsel in institutional disciplinary
hearings, the panel reasoned that Haidak essentially must have been
demanding to question opposing witnesses himself.89 The First Circuit then
conducted a Mathews analysis and found that, particularly when conducted
by “a relative tyro,” cross-examination can quickly “devolve into more of a
debate,” thus rendering its probative value marginal, if not negative, and having no effect on the risk of erroneous deprivation.90 The majority explicitly
rejected the holding in Doe v. Baum and instead stated it would permit the
questioning of a complaining witness by a neutral party, rather than by the
respondent or his agent, as long as the inquisitorial approach employed by
the school was adequate to uphold the respondent’s procedural due process
rights.91
The court expressed concern that the costs imposed on the university by
requiring trial-type procedures would outweigh the effectiveness of live crossexamination by the respondent or his counsel, and that mandating such a
procedure would lead to a slippery slope, ultimately requiring the presence
of counsel for both parties, further formalizing the process.92 In the case at
hand, the majority found that the university’s questioning procedure was
“reasonably calculated to get to the truth” because Haidak had opportunities
to be heard after the complainant spoke and the questions asked were “reasonably calculated to expose any relevant flaws in [the complainant’s]
claims.”93
Thus, though both the First and Sixth Circuits agree that a respondent
in a Title IX disciplinary hearing is entitled to some form questioning his
complainant, a circuit split exists as to whether the scope of this right
demands live cross-examination. Both courts of appeals emphasized the
importance of employing a method that would improve the accuracy of the
outcome in coming to their respective conclusions. Though the courts in
both Baum and Haidak acknowledged that a complainant may be harmed by
cross-examination, neither court devoted much time in its Mathews analysis to
fully address the subject, particularly considering how such harm impacts the
stated interest the universities have in conducting fair disciplinary hearings
and protecting their students from harm.

88
89
90
91
92
93

Haidak, 933 F.3d at 67.
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id. at 69–71.
Id. at 69–70.
Id. at 71.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-4\NDL413.txt

2020]

II. THE PERILS

unknown

Seq: 15

3-MAY-20

further harm and harassment
OF

LIVE CROSS-EXAMINATION

IN THE

15:34

1799

TITLE IX SETTING

In the wake of Baum, the University of Michigan changed its policy to
allow both claimants and respondents to directly cross-examine one another
in a Title IX hearing.94 In response, the American Civil Liberties Union of
Michigan wrote to the university’s president:
While cross-examination is essential, this form is not. It is especially susceptible to abuse, will deter some students who have experienced sexual assault
or harassment from filing complaints in the first instance, will undermine
the equitable resolution of sexual harassment complaints, and risks contributing to a hostile environment on campus.95

This Section will attempt to explain why these effects will come to fruition by exploring the nature of the harm complainants would be susceptible
to if forced to be subjected to cross-examination in a disciplinary hearing.
Then, this Section will explore how permitting a respondent accused of sexual assault to cross-examine his complainant would amount to sex discrimination in violation of Title IX itself. Finally, this Section will explain why the
First and Sixth Circuits’ cursory consideration of these harms as part of a
university’s interest was inadequate in their performance of the Mathews balancing test.
A.

The Psychological Effects of Sexual Assault on Complainants and the Impact of
Victim Retraumatization on the Credibility of Testimony

The Supreme Court has referred to cross-examination as the “greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”96 Assuming such a
powerful tool for accurately ascertaining the veracity of a claim exists, it
makes perfect sense not only why an innocent respondent would want to
employ it, but also why institutions of higher education would universally
permit it: the ultimate purpose of a hearing is to determine the truth of the
allegations in order to punish a culpable respondent and ensure that a safe,
94 UNIV. OF MICH., THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN INTERIM POLICY AND PROCEDURES ON
STUDENT SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED MISCONDUCT AND OTHER FORMS OF INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 31–33 (2019), https://studentsexualmisconductpolicy.umich.edu/files/smp/
SSMP-Policy-PDF-Version011519.pdf (“A typical hearing may include . . . questions posed
by the hearing officer to one or both of the parties . . .and follow-up questions by either party
to any witness (typically with the Respondent questioning the witness first).” (emphasis
added)).
95 Letter from the Am. Civil Liberties Union Women’s Rights Project & Am. Civil Liberties Union of Mich., to Mark S. Schlissel, President, E. Royster Harper, Vice President for
Student Life & Timothy Lynch, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Univ. of Mich., Re: Interim
Policy and Procedures on Student Sexual and Gender-Based Misconduct and Other Forms
of Interpersonal Violence (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.aclumich.org/sites/default/files/
field_documents/2019.9.5_aclu_letter_to_university_of_michigan.pdf.
96 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A
TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367,
at 29 (3d ed. 1940)).
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nondiscriminatory learning environment exists for the complainant. Neither
of these goals is furthered by introducing inaccurate testimony.
However, cross-examination is, in reality, an imperfect mechanism which
incentivizes respondents to undermine a witness’ credibility in the eyes of the
trier of fact, regardless of the truth of the testimony.97 This invariably has
collateral consequences for the witness, particularly in cases of sexual assault
violence, where victims commonly experience lingering physical and psychological effects. Such consequences weaken the power of witness testimony
and undermine the true purpose of cross-examination by interfering with the
accuracy of the testimony provided.
Sexual assault itself frequently has both short- and long-term psychological, emotional, and physical effects on a survivor. The aftermath of experiencing sexual assault may manifest in a variety of ways, including but not
limited to: post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), eating disorders, sleeping
disorders, self-harm, dissociation, flashbacks, sexually transmitted infections,
pregnancy, suicidal thoughts, and substance abuse.98 Contrary to popular
misconceptions, sexual harassment in the absence of physical violence can
also be traumatizing for victims. Survivors are frequently diagnosed with
depression or anxiety,99 which can have huge effects on their personal relationships as well as their capacity to form healthy future sexual and romantic
attachments.100 Furthermore, experiencing an assault is detrimental to a
survivor’s performance in school.101 Resulting depression and anxiety “may
diminish the energy a woman has to commit to academic work or decrease
97 See Abbe Smith, Representing Rapists: The Cruelty of Cross Examination and Other Challenges for a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255, 276 (2016) (“You
cannot make a mistake at a preliminary hearing by asking [the victim] too many questions
or the ‘wrong question.’ You want it all—helpful testimony and damaging testimony—in
order to counsel the client about his options, and because you never know what you might
uncover.”).
98 See Effects of Sexual Violence, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/effects-sexual-violence
(last visited Feb. 18, 2020); see also Elyssa Barbash, Overcoming Sexual Assault: Symptoms &
Recovery, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/
trauma-and-hope/201704/overcoming-sexual-assault-symptoms-recovery (noting that
ninety-four percent of female rape victims experience symptoms of PTSD within two weeks
of the attack and that thirty-three percent of female rape victims contemplate suicide).
99 See Nicole Spector, The Hidden Health Effects of Sexual Harassment, NBC NEWS (Oct.
13, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/better/health/hidden-health-effects-sexual-harassment-ncna810416.
100 It is often challenging for survivors to reorient themselves to consensual sex after
trauma. See generally Nicole M. Lozano, The Impact of Sexual Violence on Intimate Relationship Dynamics: A Grounded Theory Study (Oct. 2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln), https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cehsdiss/271/
(positing that healing from experiences of sexual violence while in a new intimate relationship requires disclosure from the survivor; a healthy, supportive, communicative relationship; and a strong social network).
101 See generally Carol E. Jordan et al., An Exploration of Sexual Victimization and Academic
Performance Among College Women, 15 TRAUMA VIOLENCE & ABUSE 191 (2014).
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her ability to engage with other students.”102 These psychological and physical effects, compounded by a survivor’s probable fear of interacting with her
attacker on campus, lead to changes in regular behaviors and routines, often
decreasing class attendance.103 Women experiencing such distress are significantly more likely to drop out of college than their peers.104
In addition to the initial trauma experienced during the event and its
immediate aftermath, survivors also commonly experience retraumatization.
Retraumatization is the “reliving [of] stress reactions experienced as a result
of a traumatic event when faced with a new, similar incident . . . [in which a]
current experience is subconsciously associated with the original trauma,
reawakening memories and reactions, which can be distressing.”105 Symptoms of retraumatization can include flashbacks, dissociation, trouble concentrating, anxiety, and intense feelings of distress.106 People often report
losing their ability to control their emotions, practicing “[a]voidance of people, places, and situations related to the traumatic event,” or being in denial
of past traumatic events.107 These experiences frequently lead a survivor to
experience intensified feelings of “[s]hame, blame, and . . . social isolation . . . creat[ing] a significant barrier to receiving much needed social support” and increasing the feeling of lack of safety, ultimately “keeping her in a
protracted state of anxiety and fear.”108
In order to combat these symptoms, survivors are often encouraged to
take steps to protect themselves, including seeking counseling and avoiding
triggers. Survivors may be triggered by “anything in the most literal sense
that is a reminder of the sexual assault,” including a location, smells, food,
doctor’s exams, people who look like the attacker, an anniversary date, and
even seemingly innocuous statements like comments or jokes.109 Increased
public dialogue on the topic of sexual violence as a result of the #MeToo
102 Id. at 197.
103 See id. at 193 (citing Angela Frederick Amar & Susan Gennaro, Dating Violence in
College Women: Associated Physical Injury, Healthcare Usage, and Mental Health Symptoms, 54
NURSING RES. 235–36 (2005)).
104 Id. (noting that these effects are more pronounced for historically underserved students, specifically racial and ethnic minorities and first-generation college students). (;
105 SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., TIPS FOR SURVIVORS OF A DISASTER OR OTHER TRAUMATIC EVENT: COPING WITH RETRAUMATIZATION 1 (2017), https://store
.samhsa.gov/file/23777/download?token=LwOvj0Vv&filename=SMA17-5047.pdf&sku=
SMA17-5047.
106 Id. at 3.
107 Id.
108 LORI HASKELL & MELANIE RANDALL, DEP’T OF JUSTICE CAN., THE IMPACT OF TRAUMA
ON ADULT SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS 1, 11 (2019), https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/
trauma/trauma_eng.pdf.
109 Zerlina Maxwell, If You’re Not Careful, You Could Be a Trigger, Too, WASH. POST (May
28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/05/28/if-yourenot-careful-you-could-be-a-trigger-too/ (quoting Monika Johnson Hostler, executive director of the North Carolina Coalition Against Sexual Assault, discussing possible triggers).
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movement has created constant, painful reminders for survivors.110 Of
course, no stimulus spurs a more powerful reaction than being face to face
with the attacker himself.
The credibility of a complainant’s testimony is essential to an ultimate
finding of guilt in a Title IX case; thus, if cross-examination is permitted, a
respondent is incentivized to undermine this credibility, regardless of the
truth of the testimony, in order to defend himself. Abbe Smith, a criminal
defense attorney who frequently cross-examines rape victims in her practice,
writes that defense attorneys usually begin cross-examination by “finding out
everything about the central witness” through “thorough, detailed questioning.”111 Then, “[t]he witness’s answers—memorialized in a transcript—
become grist for later ‘impeachment’ in case he or she is at all
inconsistent.”112
Impeaching a witness involves attacking one or more of the following: a
witness’s perception, memory, or sincerity. Traumatic experiences themselves have detrimental effects on one’s perception, impeding one’s ability to
give accurate testimony. “While witnessing normally proceeds ‘from seeing
to saying’, this order can be reversed when the witness is traumatized: irretrievable experience is reinvented in recounting.”113 In the eyes of a trier of
fact, this inability to recall details or confusion surely undermines a witness’s
credibility.
During live cross-examination, a complainant’s sincerity could be called
into question if she made any inconsistent statement or displayed a nervous
demeanor. Because Title IX proceedings often hinge on witness credibility,
any perceived insincerity on the part of the complainant could obviously be
fatal to her case, regardless of whether it was caused by actual malice, bias,
mistake, the physical effects of the assault, or the confrontation with the
respondent himself. In the presence of the respondent, there is no real
meaningful way to discern what caused a fault in the complainant’s testimony. Thus, live cross-examination of a victim of sexual violence is inherently flawed, particularly in the presence of the accused, and cannot fulfill its
purported purpose: to distinguish between truth and fiction.
B.

Gender Bias

In Cannon, the Supreme Court made it clear that the “unmistakable
focus [of Title IX was] on the benefited class” rather than the perpetrator,114
and the legislative history of the statute makes it obvious that the statute was
110 Alison Bowen, Harm from a Sexual Assault Can Continue for Years. The Triggers Are All
Around., CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/sc-famhow-assault-lingers-1002-story.html.
111 Smith, supra note 97, at 256–57, 273.
112 Id. at 273 (“The cross-examination is full of verbal fencing—and fear[.]”).
113 Claudia Welz, Trauma, Memory, Testimony, 27 SCRIPTA INSTITUTI DONNERIANI ABOENSIS 104, 105 (2016).
114 Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 691 (1979).
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intended to secure equal access to education for women.115 According to
the Department of Justice, ninety-one percent of rape victims are women and
nearly ninety-nine percent of their rapists are men.116 Thus, it stands to reason that a majority of the complainants that are being subject to cross-examination by their alleged assaulters, and thus experiencing the harmful effects
of retraumatization, will be women. The motive of many pro-respondent
attorneys and men’s civil rights groups reflects this gender disparity, as evidenced by the backlash to Obama-era guidelines, which is steeped in subtly
sexist rhetoric.117
In Davis, the Court reasoned that it was fair to hold schools liable for
student-on-student sexual harassment where the school exerts “substantial
control over both the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs.”118 In Title IX hearings, it cannot be disputed that universities
have complete control over the process or that the risk of harm to complainants that will result from cross-examination is obvious. By pursuing adjudication via university disciplinary process, complainants, who could have
otherwise pursued law enforcement avenues or not reported the misconduct
at all, become dependent on such procedures. Therefore, where schools
themselves directly expose their students to harm by permitting respondents
to conduct live cross-examinations of complainants, schools themselves are
directly “subject[ing] [persons] to discrimination” under its “program[s] or
activit[ies]” and thus are in violation of Title IX.119
Instituting cross-examination in disciplinary hearings will, at the very
least, deter survivors from pursuing disciplinary outcomes for their attackers,
and, at most, deter disclosure altogether. Evidence has shown that survivors
are deterred from reporting upon hearing anecdotes of failed complaints or
traumatic administrative procedures, ultimately resulting in a cycle of unreported cases.120 Thus, by deterring disclosure and directly subjecting complainants to harm as a result of being victims of sexual violence, schools
permitting live cross-examination of complainants are directly violating Title
IX.
C.

What This Means for the Mathews Balancing Test

In determining the minimum procedures required to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment in university disciplinary hearings for sexual misconduct
115 Venetis, supra note 24, at 132–33.
116 LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEX
OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 2 (1997),
https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/SOO.pdf.
117 See generally Annaleigh E. Curtis, Due Process Demands as Propaganda: The Rhetoric of
Title IX Opposition, 29 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 273 (2017).
118 Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645 (1999).
119 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
120 See LAUREN J. GERMAIN, CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT: COLLEGE WOMEN RESPOND 75–78
(2016).
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matters, courts have hardly paid lip service to the extent of a university’s
interest in protecting survivors of sexual assault at the hands of their peers.
The Mathews test to determine what additional predeprivation measures
are required involves a balancing of an individual’s interest against the government’s.121 The court in Baum reasoned that it would simply cost the university “very little” to implement a live hearing with an opportunity for crossexamination.122 In Haidak, the court succinctly summed up the two interests
being balanced: the respondent faced “a substantial suspension and complete expulsion,” while the university “had probable cause to believe that he
had used undue physical force on another student and continued to harass
her.”123 Furthermore, in reasoning that a respondent had no due process
right to personally cross-examine his complainant, the court looked not to
the obvious harm a survivor may be subject to but instead to the administrative costs of imposing trial-like procedures.124 These analyses completely
overlook the purpose of Title IX: to ensure that students receive equal access
to educational activities and programs, regardless of their gender. The government’s undeniable interest in ensuring that taxpayer dollars are not funneled into programs that permit discrimination and protecting students from
gender violence has seemingly been completely ignored by the courts.
Instead of focusing on the harms that would be inevitably inflicted on
complainants in a live cross-examination, institutions of higher education
have been expressly permitted by the courts to place emphasis solely on minimizing exposure to financial liability from Title IX suits125 and the costs of
implementing additional formalized procedures. This failure to account for
the lived experiences of female students ultimately amounts to what Carly
Parnitzke Smith and Jennifer J. Freyd refer to as an “institutional betrayal,”126
or an institution’s “failure to prevent or respond supportively to wrongdoings
by individuals . . . committed within the context of the institution.”127 This

121 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
122 Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 582 (6th Cir. 2018).
123 Haidak v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 933 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2019).
124 Id. at 69 (“To impose . . . even truncated trial-type procedures might well overwhelm administrative facilities in many places and, by diverting resources, cost more than
it would save in educational effectiveness.” (omission original) (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 583 (1975))).
125 See UNITED EDUCATORS, LARGE LOSS REPORT 2019, at 1 (2019), https://www.ue.org/
uploadedFiles/Large-Loss-Report-2019.pdf (noting an increase in damage awards and settlements worth more than $250,000 in the wake of the #MeToo movement and cases
against educational institutions).
126 Carly Parnitzke Smith & Jennifer J. Freyd, Institutional Betrayal, 69 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
575, 575 (2014).
127 Jennifer J. Freyd, Addressing Sexual Violence Through Institutional Courage, PROJECT ON
INSTITUTIONAL COURAGE., https://www.jjfreyd.com/project-on-institutional-courage (last
visited Feb. 19, 2020).
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phenomenon further dehumanizes victims and leads to deterrence of reporting, creating a vicious cycle of abuse without accountability.128
Thus, courts have failed to recognize that sexual assault and harassment
are more than just an obstacle for victims pursuing an education—for many,
they can be absolutely debilitating, impeding every aspect of the college
experience. Universities, who have a special relationship with their student
body, must be said to have an interest in preventing the furtherance of the
harm caused by gender-based violence and harassment on campuses.
III. EVALUATING THE DEPARTMENT’S PROPOSED RULE
A MORE JUST SOLUTION

AND

OFFERING

Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos announced the impending rescission of the Obama-era Dear Colleague letter on September 7, 2017.129 The
following November, the proposed rule was published in the federal register.130 If the rule were to go into effect,131 institutions of higher education
must provide for a live hearing. At the hearing, the decision-maker must
permit each party to ask the other party and any witnesses all relevant questions and
follow-up questions, including those challenging credibility. Such cross-examination at a hearing must be conducted by the party’s advisor of choice, notwithstanding the discretion of the [university] . . . to otherwise restrict the
extent to which advisors may participate in the proceedings. If a party does
not have an advisor present at the hearing, the [school] must provide that
party an advisor . . . . At the request of either party, the [school] must provide for cross-examination to occur with the parties located in separate
rooms with technology enabling the decision-maker and parties to simultaneously see and hear the party answering questions.132

Advocates for enhanced procedural due process protections in Title IX
hearings herald the holding of Baum133 and its codification in the proposed
rule. However, the new rule would unnecessarily exceed the protections advo128 See Brooke Mascagni, Rape, Apology, and the Business of Title IX Compliance, 5 POL.,
GROUPS & IDENTITIES 182, 188–90 (2017) (“Rather than engaging in damage control,
silencing . . . survivors of sexual violence, . . . [schools should] recognize[ ] the utility of
institutional apology and reconciliation.”).
129 DeVos Address, supra note 1.
130 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be
codified at 35 C.F.R. pt. 106).
131 For purposes of this Note, we will assume that, although not yet legally binding,
institutions of higher education have begun to take efforts to conform to all the requirements and recommendations laid out in the proposed rule, as they did with the 2011 Dear
Colleague letter.
132 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,474–75 (emphasis added).
133 See, e.g., Comment of the Found. for Individual Rights in Educ. in Support of the
Department of Education’s Proposed Regulations on Title IX Enforcement 34–35 (Jan. 30,
2019), https://d28htnjz2elwuj.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/30173030/
FIRE-Comment-Title-IX-Enforcement-Appendicies.pdf.
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cated for by the circuit courts at the expense of complainants: the Sixth Circuit only required “some form” of cross-examination,134 while the First
Circuit expressly disapproved of any university practice that would permit a
respondent to directly question a complainant.135
The proposed rule purports to exclude any unnecessary questioning
about the complainant’s sexual history.136 However, even practicing attorneys with ethical obligations violate professional rules when it comes to questioning witnesses while defending their clients for one simple reason: “[T]he
use of unethical forms of cross-examination . . . are the most effective from a
trial advocacy perspective.”137 If we cannot trust attorneys in actual courts to
protect the rights of witnesses against their clients, why should we trust them
in less formal university proceedings to do the same? Let alone, how we
could trust a nonattorney “agent” of the respondent whose interests are
“closely aligned” with that of the accused to do so? Furthermore, schools are
still permitted to ban parties from bringing in agents on their behalf during
official proceedings under the proposed rule.138 Thus, where universities
wanted to avoid the additional expense of providing representation or training laypeople as representatives, or (sensibly) were suspect of the benefits of
introducing an additional, likely biased third party into the disciplinary process, direct cross-examination would be required.
Furthermore, the proposed rule’s broad attempt to codify Baum’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment leaves a crucial question: Why hold
private universities to the same standard? Title IX is a Spending Clause statute, but the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to public universities.139
Unlike primary and secondary education, the Supreme Court has long held
that one is not legally entitled to pursue public higher education, let alone
private higher education.140 Though private universities may be at risk of a
134 Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 581 (6th Cir. 2018).
135 Haidak v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 933 F.3d 56, 68–70 (1st Cir. 2019).
136 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,475 (“All cross-examination must
exclude evidence of the complainant’s sexual behavior or predisposition, unless such evidence about the complainant’s sexual behavior is offered to prove that someone other
than the respondent committed the conduct . . . or if the evidence concerns specific incidents of the complainant’s sexual behavior with respect to the respondent and is offered to
prove consent.”).
137 Todd A. Berger, The Ethical Limits of Discrediting the Truthful Witness: How Modern
Ethics Rules Fail to Prevent Truthful Witnesses from Being Discredited Through Unethical Means, 99
MARQ. L. REV. 283, 286 (2015).
138 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,474.
139 For an argument that the distinction between private and public colleges should be
eliminated and that the Constitution should apply with equal force to so-called “private”
universities, see Richard Vedder, There Are Really Almost No Truly Private Universities, FORBES
(Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardvedder/2018/04/08/there-arereally-almost-no-truly-private-universities/#25fccc3357bc.
140 See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Miss. v. Waugh, 62 So. 827, 830–31 (Miss. 1913), aff’d, 237
U.S. 589 (1915).
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breach of contract suit for departing from policies laid out in student handbooks, private institutions are not instruments of the state (thus lacking the
same coercive power as the state) and thus are not held to more stringent
constitutional standards.141 That is not to say that private universities
shouldn’t comport to due process standards in an effort to promote fairness
and preserve the perceived legitimacy of their processes, but rather, it seems
to be a choice that a private university should have the leeway to make for
itself by weighing its own values.
Instead, the DOE should deploy official notice-and-comment rulemaking to expressly prohibit the live cross-examination of victims of serious gender-based violence from either the respondent or his agent. Rather, the
DOE should mandate the approach employed by the University of Massachusetts-Amherst in Haidak: a neutral factfinder asks questions of the complainant submitted by the respondent with the discretion to alter or eliminate
questions as appropriate for the circumstances. This discretion could be constrained to purposes related to the impact on the complainant, perhaps
based on the severity of the incident as well as the symptoms experienced by
the particular complainant.
The rules could also instruct university hearing boards to meet directly
with both the complainant and respondent separately to ensure the board
has the opportunity to assess the demeanor of each party in answering questions. This would satisfy the Sixth Circuit’s stated preference for live testimony, allowing triers of fact to assess witness demeanor for sincerity or
irregularities, without subjecting the complainant to the harms of retraumatization that would likely follow from a direct confrontation between her and
her attacker. Furthermore, such a procedure would serve the ultimate purpose of cross-examination, to ascertain the truth in a situation in order to
ensure a just result, by tempering the effects of retraumatization on the testimony. Finally, the DOE could compel universities to provide each party with
a transcript of the other’s testimony. Where the respondent felt his questions
had been inappropriately altered, the transcript could be used as evidence
upon appeal or ultimately in a suit against the university.
CONCLUSION
In modern America, higher education remains a privilege, not a right.
In assessing what due process rights are owed in Title IX hearings, courts
have failed to recognize that they are not just weighing a respondent’s interest in avoiding stigma and receiving an education against the interest of an
141 But see Doe v. Rhodes Coll., No. 2:19-cv-02336 (W.D. Tenn. June 14, 2019) (order
granting in part and denying in part plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction). There, the district court granted a temporary restraining
order for the plaintiff, who had been expelled from the private university as a result of
Title IX proceedings, which allowed him to return to campus (but not to graduate).
Though the court conceded that the due process protections in the Fourteenth Amendment do not bind private institutions and cannot be invoked in a state breach of contract
claim, Judge Fowlkes inferred that due process rights were guaranteed via Title IX itself.
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institution bearing the marginal costs of providing additional process.
Courts must instead remember that the stakes are much higher: the dignity,
health, and opportunity to receive an education of complainants are on the
line, not to mention the legitimacy of the disciplinary process in the eyes of
an entire gender. If Secretary DeVos is correct that “rights of one person can
never be paramount to the rights of another,”142 we must demand university
disciplinary processes that incentivize victims to come forward, protect them
from further harm at the hands of the institution, and effectively combat the
epidemic of gender-based violence on campuses. Though providing a fair
forum for respondents is imperative, particularly to preserve the legitimacy of
the process in the eyes of victims and the public at large and to ensure
respondents are not subject to sham procedures (that would likely amount to
a separate violation of Title IX), this cannot come at the expense of the ultimate goal of Title IX: to ensure that women receive equitable access to
higher education.

142

DeVos Address, supra note 1.

